

1. [] US Capability for Immediate

STAT

Detection of DEV Violations of the DMZ, has been
completed in typescript and is in [] hands.

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2. Notice No. 65-67, Haiti, is to be completed
IN TYPESCRIPT.
overnight. ~~in typescript~~ We don't have text
yet. It is being coordinated with ONE and with DDP.
YOU MIGHT CHANGE THE MEMO STATUS SHEET TO REFLECT

~~TEXT~~

THE FACT THAT IT IS TO BE READY AT OOB 27 JUNE.

Done.

Enclosed copies are not part of
the 15 requested, which went to

STAT

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*Delivered to Koston on
27 June 1967*

NSC & STATE review(s)
completed.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002200270001-2

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22 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Haiti

1. Mr. W. Rostow chaired a meeting on Haiti. Also present were: Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, Covey T. Oliver; his deputy, Mr. Robert Sayre; Ambassador to the OAS, Sol Linowitz; Mr. Long, Mr. Eger of State Department; former ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Timmons; Mr. William Lang of ISA; [redacted] of CIA; and Mr. William Bowdler of the White House Staff.

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2. Mr. Rostow said that the President was concerned about the situation in Haiti. He then asked the newly appointed Assistant Secretary Oliver to take the floor. Oliver expressed his concern and then stated that he felt a variation of C and D of the Contingency Coordinating Committee's paper on Haiti seemed more likely -- or, perhaps, more closely D. He is particularly concerned with the US Lines of Action that have a bearing on those operations regarding US public, the US Congress and the other Latin American governments. What do we say publicly in the event the Haitian situation explodes and requires military intervention? What do we say to the American republics?

3. Mr. Lonowitz mentioned talks he had recently with representatives in the OAS. The Argentine ambassador, who is close to his foreign minister, said that without an IAPF the US must pick up the pieces. He might have been hinting that we should push for an IAPF. The Brazilian ambassador said he had instructions to keep Haiti off any

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agenda for the OAS meeting that will discuss Venezuela's charges against Cuba. The Dominican ambassador said that he feels the US press has greatly overplayed the dangers in Haiti. (He obviously hasn't been reading his own press which is much more strident.) Linowitz said that President Frei was indirect in his response on Haiti when the ambassador was recently in Chile. Frei opined that if the situation in Haiti should endanger the hemisphere "something would have to be done."

4. It was noted that a few of the Latin American foreign ministers would soon be -- or were presently at -- the United Nations. Mr. Rostow suggested that Secretary Rusk might want to talk informally to them about Haiti.

5. Linowitz felt that Article 39 of the Charter of the OAS would permit moving in any military if the need arose. Mr. Rostow opined that the mix of any force sent in would be different from that that went into the Dominican Republic in 1965. He felt that perhaps police and economic types would be useful. Mr. Oliver said we should be trying to get juridical cover through discussions in the OAS. Should the situation "blow" there should be a factual sit-rep "at whatever hour" by the President to the other presidents of the OAS countries, to Linowitz for his colleagues in the OAS and to the Latin American ambassadors in Washington and to all of our embassies in Latin America. This same type of multiple communications on a draft resolution for the OAS. There should also be quick action to prevent any ship landings on Haitian beaches. The question was raised as to whether there should not be a Caribbean naval patrol -- ours and others. Also a quick and "fresh look" would have to be made at the CCC paper on Haiti.

6. Mr. Sayre raised the question of an OAS technical mission to Haiti in order to provide an OAS presence there. Such a group could -- and would probably at any rate -- take a lot of time on feasibility studies before we would be faced with any requests for large capital investments.

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7. Former ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Timmons, feels that chaos will not break out when Duvalier goes. This was not a general consensus. In fact, Mr. Rostow asked in this regard what pressures were on Duvalier that makes him feel he must murder so many people, especially some of his own cohorts.

8. Mr. Linowitz feels that intelligence should keep on top of any information on any outside help, especially from Communists. Mr. Oliver feels we should have more discussions with the small Caribbean countries to see if we can get help or at least suggestions from them. Mr. Sayre pointed out that there is an outgoing message from State to all of our embassies in Latin America. We have replies from seven large countries because they received the request by cable -- the smaller countries were getting airgrams.

9. At times the suggestion was made that when Haiti blows it might be more like a "Watts affair" than a coup. In this case police and economic technicians would seem more appropriate. Mr. Rostow asked if we knew any Latinos who spoke French and who might be able to head up such a group. Mr. Oliver mentioned a former Colombian foreign minister by the name of Caicedo Castilla. The subject ended there.

10. Mr. Oliver again mentioned that we must have a basis of stopping second guessing, especially from our Congress.

11. Mr. Rostow asked that CIA prepare a paper on Communists and Haiti, with emphasis on facts and figures and not generalizations.

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No. 1253/67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 June 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Capabilities in Haiti

Introduction

1. The Communist movement in Haiti is divided and weak and has only a limited capability for sponsoring anti-Duvalier activities at the present time. We do not believe the Haitian Communists will play a significant role in a post-Duvalier situation unless near anarchy develops in the country. Communist opportunities after Duvalier will be greatly affected by the manner of his demise. More than likely, some kind of "palace coup" will occur which would present the Communists with a fait accompli. They would have little room for maneuver unless widespread opposition developed against the new ruler or rulers. If the new government could not soon establish its authority, the Communists' capability for exploiting the situation would markedly increase.

2. Haitian Communists inside and outside Haiti may number as many as 650. Only 125 of them can be considered dedicated, hard-core Communists; many are in exile. Nevertheless, Communist leaders, witnessing the erosion of the Duvalier regime during the past nine months, have embarked on a program to train cadres, hoping that they will be able to take advantage of any disorganization which might follow Duvalier's demise.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services.

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3. Until about a year ago the two Communist parties in Haiti were the Party of Popular Accord (PEP), a Moscow-oriented party, and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN), a nationalist and essentially Castroist party. The PPLN has been in disarray since a government crack-down in mid-1965, when its leadership was arrested or driven into exile. Nevertheless, the party continued to exist until it was succeeded in mid-1966 by a more militant Communist party referred to by its Creole initials as PUDA (United Haitian Democratic Party). Recent information suggests that the PEP and the PUDA are collaborating to some degree in a "united front," both inside and outside of Haiti.

Current Situation

4. The total membership of the PEP is believed to range from 200 to 500. The identities of current Central Committee members are unknown, but Gerald Brisson and Raymond Jean-Francois appear to be leading PEP members. The PEP's strategy is to follow a united front policy, seeking alliances with other "progressive" groups inside and outside of Haiti such as PUDA. PEP and its front activities are coordinated by its representative in Mexico, Gerard Pierre-Charles. Most of the PEP's funds come from the USSR, but it has also received financial support from the French and Italian parties as well as the Cubans and a Communist faction in the Dominican Republic.

5. In an attempt to re-establish itself after the regime's repressive actions in mid-1965, the PPLN changed its name to the Haitian United Democratic Party (PUDA). Its leaders are believed to be Roger Gaillard, Yves Barbot, Lionel Loubeau, and Frank Nau. The PUDA may have been involved in the antiregime demonstrations in St. Marc, Arcahaie, and Gonaives last fall. PUDA members and sympathizers in Haiti may number as many as 150. The PUDA has little political influence among Haitian exiles, although it does have contacts across the border in the Dominican Republic with some members of the former "Constitutionalist" forces there. The PUDA has at least one leader in the Dominican Republic recruiting Haitians located there. Inside Haiti, the PUDA has linked

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up with a small Marxist-oriented Catholic political group and a pro-Chinese group to form a front to counter PEP's coalition. There is some evidence of cooperation between the PEP and PUDA groups, but the extent of this collaboration is not clear.

6. So far, the Haitian Communists are believed to possess only a limited number of arms, probably no more than a few revolvers and home made bombs. The PEP claims credit, however, for the three bombs which exploded in Port-au-Prince in mid-April.

International Contacts and Assistance

7. One PEP leader is stationed in the Dominican Republic and acts as an operations and support officer. He recruits Haitians living in the Dominican Republic who are willing to return to Haiti and arranges for them to receive training in weapons handling. The PEP maintains a clandestine communications system with its officers in the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic as well as in Mexico.

8. Cuba beams 14 hours of propaganda radio broadcasts to Haiti each week. It has also provided some training, but only to a small number of Haitian revolutionaries. Some Cuban funds may also be reaching one or two of the more militant Haitian exile organizations.

9. The USSR has provided financial assistance to the PEP for a number of years, but has also trained some Haitian Communists in schools in the Soviet Union. In 1966, 15 Haitians reportedly were being trained in Marxist doctrine and guerrilla warfare in the USSR; the Soviets also maintain contacts with leading Communist Haitian exile organizations.

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11. Duvalier's control apparatus has undergone considerable erosion in recent weeks. About one fifth of his military household has been replaced, with a concomitant weakening of the regime's repressive powers. Nevertheless, the conclusion reached in National Intelligence Estimate 86.1-66, The Situation and Prospects in Haiti, of October 1966 is still largely valid today: "The two Communist parties are too small and weak to be able to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that outside Communist support--from Castro, the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exiles--would be forthcoming on a significant scale."

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